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H. Allan Hunt and Marcus Dillender
Benefit Adequacy in State 
and Provincial Workers’ 
Compensation Programs
It is still not possible to make 
acceptably accurate and 
meaningful comparisons among 
systems across different studies.
For over 30 years, the Upjohn 
Institute has been involved in research 
and analysis of state and provincial 
workers’ compensation programs for 
workers disabled by their employment 
in Australia, Canada, and the United 
States. These programs mandate medical 
treatment to promote recovery and return 
to work, as well as wage-replacement 
benefits to enable workers to maintain 
themselves during the recovery, and are 
financed by employer contributions, either 
through private insurance or public funds. 
A major focus of this policy work 
at the Upjohn Institute has been the 
adequacy of wage-replacement benefits 
for these workers. If benefits are too low, 
injured workers will struggle to recover 
and perhaps become a burden on society. 
If benefits are too high, employers will 
bear unnecessary expense and injured 
workers may be tempted to malinger. 
A highlight for the Institute was 
the publication in 2004 of Adequacy 
of Earnings Replacement in Workers’ 
Compensation Programs (Hunt 2004), 
developed by the National Academy of 
Social Insurance, Study Panel on Benefit 
Adequacy of the Academy’s Workers’ 
Compensation Steering Committee. This 
monograph reviews the analytical options 
and endorses what they call “modern 
wage loss studies” as the preferred way to 
address the issue of benefit adequacy. 
Previous Empirical Work
Reville et al. (2001) evaluate 
the benefit adequacy of workers’ 
compensation for permanent partial 
disability (PPD) claimants in New 
Mexico using this wage loss design. In 
addition, they compare replacement rates 
for PPD claimants in New Mexico to 
PPD claimants in California, Wisconsin, 
Washington, and Oregon. To calculate 
loss replacement rates, they examine the 
degree to which workers’ compensation 
benefits, which are tax-free in all 
states, offset the earnings differences 
between workers with partially disabling 
occupational injuries and similar workers 
without injuries during the 5 years after 
the injury. 
During the first 5 years after the injury, 
the pretax loss replacement rate in New 
Mexico was 65 percent, nearly identical 
to the two-thirds statutory standard. But 
projections for the 10 years after the 
injury show the pretax loss replacement 
rate falling to 46 percent, as benefit 
payments were completed, and wage 
losses continued into the future. In fact, 
there seems to be a permanent loss of 
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earnings among workers’ compensation 
claimants that remains unexplained. 
Ten-year pretax replacement rates were 
estimated at 37 percent in California, 
42 percent in Oregon, 41 percent in 
Washington, and 29 percent in Wisconsin. 
Thus, New Mexico had the highest 
replacement rates in any of the states. 
However, after adjusting for differences 
in industry composition among the states, 
it was apparent that New Mexico had a 
replacement rate that was in the middle. 
This was the state of benefit adequacy 
research when the National Academy of 
Social Insurance and the Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research published 
their book in 2004. The study panel 
concluded that “. . . for all categories 
involving substantial lost time from 
work or permanent disabilities, aggregate 
replacement rates are considerably below 
the two-thirds standard when considered 
over the 10-year period following the 
injury” (p. 132).
In addition, the study panel called 
for more wage loss studies from other 
jurisdictions, especially studies that 
included temporary disability claims and 
studies from states that used alternative 
methods for setting permanent partial 
disability benefits. The expectation 
was that additional studies would 
provide more guidance to policymakers 
seeking the most adequate, equitable, 
and efficient wage replacement policy. 
Unfortunately, no further studies were 
forthcoming for the next five years. 
More Recent Studies
Tompa et al. (2010) have contributed 
a more recent Canadian perspective to 
this body of work. In a path-setting study 
for the Workplace Safety and Insurance 
Board in Ontario, they compare the 
benefit adequacy of three Canadian 
compensation regimes: 1) the permanent 
impairment regime in place in Ontario 
before the 1990 reforms (impairment); 
2) the loss of earnings capacity regime 
installed in Ontario by the 1990 
reforms (loss of earnings capacity); 
and 3) the “bifurcated” compensation 
regime (claimant gets the higher of the 
impairment or loss of earnings capacity 
benefit) in British Columbia before 2002 
(bifurcated). 
Tompa et al. (2010) also develop an 
additional measure of benefit adequacy, 
differentiating between the loss 
replacement rate used in the previous 
studies in the United States and what 
they call the “earnings replacement 
rate.” The loss replacement rate uses 
the gap between postinjury earnings 
of injured workers and comparison 
group earnings as the denominator, 
with workers’ compensation benefits 
paid as the numerator to calculate the 
rate. The earnings replacement rate 
adds the postinjury earnings of injured 
workers to the numerator, thereby 
taking into account the residual earning 
capacity of injured workers. The result 
is a significantly higher measured 
replacement rate, but also recognition of 
the fact that most injured workers will 
return to work and their earnings losses 
will be temporary. 
Figure 1 compares the postinjury 
earnings plus workers’ compensation 
benefits paid to injured workers with 
the after-tax earnings of an uninjured 
comparison group in Canada. Benefit 
adequacy is expressed as the percentage 
of earnings that are replaced by the 
sum of workers’ compensation benefit 
payments plus earnings for the 10 years 
following the injury. The figure displays 
these estimates for a range of impairment 
levels, from the minor (1–5 percent 
impairment) to the very serious (more 
than 50 percent impairment). It is worth 
noting that all three of the Canadian 
workers’ compensation systems achieve 
at least 85 percent earnings replacement 
rates, with the British Columbia 
bifurcated system coming out on top 
(which is predictable, given that this 
scheme pays whichever of the other two 
benefits is higher). 
These earnings replacement rates 
cannot be precisely compared with 
the earlier studies in the United 
States because of the differences in 
methodology. However, since Tompa et 
al. (2010) did report the aggregate loss 
replacement rates for these three workers’ 
compensation regimes, this facilitates 
rough comparisons with the U.S. studies 
cited earlier. For the Ontario pre-1990 
impairment rating system, the aggregate 
after-tax loss replacement rate was 76 
percent. For the post-1990 Ontario loss 
of earnings capacity rating system, the 
aggregate after-tax replacement rate was 
80 percent. And for the British Columbia 
bifurcated system, the aggregate after-
tax replacement rate was 95 percent. 
SOURCE: Developed by the authors from Tompa et al. (2010).
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It is also interesting to note that the 
loss replacement rates and earnings 
replacement rates both increase with 
the severity of impairment. Clearly, all 
three of these Canadian regimes were 
substantially more generous in replacing 
lost earnings for injured workers than 
any of the U.S. jurisdictions studied 
previously. 
Workers Compensation Research 
Institute Michigan Study
The Workers Compensation Research 
Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research recently 
collaborated on a study of benefit 
adequacy of the workers’ compensation 
system in Michigan. Michigan does 
not use an independent assessment of 
the degree of impairment for injured 
workers. As a proxy for severity of 
injury, the number of weeks of wage 
loss compensation that are paid to the 
injured worker is used. It is logical that 
an injury that requires more weeks away 
from work is probably more serious, but 
there may be other things that influence 
the duration of disability payments, so 
this is not the equivalent of an estimate 
of residual disability that would be 
available from an impairment system (as 
in Ontario). 
Figure 2 shows the proportional 
earnings losses by duration of weekly 
compensation payments compared to 
the after-tax baseline earnings of the 
comparison workers (set at 100 percent) 
in Michigan. It is apparent from the 
figure that the largest losses are sustained 
by claims with disability durations over 
16 weeks (about 20 percent losses) and 
those receiving lump-sum settlements 
of contested claims (about 60 percent 
losses). The workers with less serious 
injuries show earnings losses of 3–10 
percent of comparison group earnings. As 
in previous studies, these losses appear to 
persist for many years. 
Figure 3 shows the time trend of 
average after-tax earnings replacement 
by disability duration for each calendar 
quarter around the injury. After-tax 
earnings replacement rates average 
96 percent, and loss replacement rates 
average 76 percent for all claims. 
However, the permanent nature of the 
earnings reductions associated with 
disability claims also stands out for 
all groups as the trend lines fall below 
100 percent and continue to decline 
gradually for 19 quarters (nearly 5 years). 
Projections out to 10 years based on the 
NOTE: TD = total disability; PPD/LS = permanent partial disability/lump sum.
SOURCE: Savych and Hunt, forthcoming.
NOTE: TD = total disability; PPD/LS = permanent partial disability/lump sum.
SOURCE: Savych and Hunt, forthcoming.
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results in year 5 drop estimated after-tax 
earnings replacement rates to 89 percent 
for all claims and 67 percent for the PPD/
LS group. 
One other notable feature of Figure 
3 is that the lump-sum recipient group 
shows actual compensation above 100 
percent of comparison group earnings 
in quarters 5–11 following the injury. 
This reflects the administrative delays 
associated with disputed workers’ 
compensation claims that generally have 
to wait 1–3 years before their claim is 
settled and payments received. Obviously 
this raises questions about income 
adequacy during the interim period. 
While Michigan shows a good short-
term wage replacement performance 
compared to other states, the workers’ 
compensation wage loss benefits in 
Michigan do not prevent the long-term 
earnings decline of injured workers 
relative to those with medical-only 
injuries. This remains one of the 
mysteries behind these studies. 
Conclusions 
It is disappointing that there have not 
been more of these empirical benefit 
adequacy studies in the 10 years since the 
National Academy of Social Insurance 
panel report. In the current political 
climate, perhaps it is not surprising, 
but given the gravity of the concerns 
expressed about the adequacy of benefits 
in workers’ compensation programs, 
it is unfortunate. Our methods are 
improving, but the data requirements 
and sensitivity of results to analytical 
assumptions remain as daunting barriers. 
It is still not possible to make acceptably 
accurate and meaningful comparisons 
among systems across different studies. 
Although we have a better understanding 
of some of the determinants of adequacy, 
they are overwhelmed by the impact of 
methodological assumptions underlying 
the research results. 
But there is hope from a new 
approach. The Workers Compensation 
Research Institute has initiated a worker-
interview-based series, “Predictors of 
Worker Outcomes,” in eight states, 
and plans to increase the number of 
states and repeat the survey in some 
states to provide benchmarks of 
system performance as more evidence 
accumulates. Despite the fact that the 
measure of wage loss is a subjective one, 
this effort has two major advantages over 
the data-intensive wage-replacement 
studies conducted to date. First, it pairs 
the question of postinjury earnings 
recovery with parallel concerns about 
the access to and satisfaction with 
medical care, the perceived recovery 
of health and function, and the return 
to work performance for a random 
sample of individual injured workers. 
Second, a more holistic and less data-
intensive approach promises more useful 
comparisons between states and a more 
thorough understanding of the adequacy 
of workers’ compensation benefits. 
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The establishment of this award 
further pursues the mission of the 
Upjohn Institute: to support and 
conduct policy-oriented research on 
issues related to employment and 
unemployment. Dissertations were 
judged by a panel of economists on 
the basis of policy relevance, technical 
quality of research, and presentation.
PRIZES
The co-winners of the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute Dissertation Award each 
receive a prize of $2,500. The 
honorable mention recipient receives 
a $1,000 prize.
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the 2015 W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
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the 2015 prize. Contact the Institute 
for more information: http://www 
.upjohn.org.
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Zhuan Pei
How Long before 
Recertifying Medicaid 
and CHIP Children? 
Income-based eligibility recertification 
is an essential component in virtually 
all means-tested social programs in the 
United States. It exists to ensure that 
the benefit is targeted at the neediest 
individuals or families. In many studies 
that examine the effect of means-tested 
programs on labor supply, an implicit 
assumption is that program eligibility 
is constantly monitored. However, 
many of these programs do not operate 
this way, and the time between two 
consecutive eligibility certifications, or 
the “recertification period,” can be as 
long as a year. Although this policy lever 
is recognized and its effect on program 
participation is explored in several studies 
of transfer programs (e.g., Currie and 
Grogger 2001; Kabbani and Wilde 2003; 
Prell 2008; and Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu 
2008), a formal theoretical and empirical 
investigation has not been carried out to 
address how program participants may 
respond to the incentives resulting from 
the lack of constant income monitoring. 
In my research, I attempt to fill this 
gap by examining families’ behavioral 
responses to the continuous eligibility 
provision for children participating in 
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP, or simply 
CHIP). The analysis of income and labor 
supply responses is key in answering 
the important policy question of how 
often eligibility monitoring should be 
conducted.
Uninterrupted eligibility monitoring 
ensures that an income-tested program is 
effectively targeting the needy. However, 
if monitoring is costly and incomes 
of program participants change little 
over time, it may be sensible for the 
government to decrease the frequency 
of eligibility checks and offer a period 
of “continuous eligibility.” Granting 
continuous eligibility increases the value 
of a transfer program to its participants in 
two ways. First, less frequent monitoring 
reduces transaction costs associated with 
gathering eligibility materials and visiting 
caseworkers for program beneficiaries. 
Second, continuous eligibility provisions 
allow families to be less constrained in 
their labor supply decisions. That is, once 
households qualify for an income-tested 
program for a specified period, they will 
not be disqualified even if their incomes 
exceed the maximum income threshold, 
allowing them to work the desired 
amount while retaining their benefits. 
However, the provisions increase the 
possibility for less needy households 
to lower their incomes temporarily in 
order to qualify for the program, and 
then revert to their usual incomes while 
enjoying the benefits. 
Because the families that behave 
strategically are not the intended 
beneficiaries of the program, setting the 
continuous eligibility period involves 
the trade-off between minimizing the 
number of such families and reducing 
the economic loss associated with 
monitoring. As mentioned above, the loss 
includes the administrative costs to the 
government, pecuniary and time costs 
of families participating in the program, 
and the deprivation of program benefits 
for some of the families most in need 
when the transaction costs of eligibility 
recertifications become insurmountable. 
Olson, Tang, and Newacheck (2005) 
show that children who experience 
interruptions in health insurance coverage 
are more likely to have unmet health care 
needs; therefore, imposing bureaucratic 
burden on otherwise eligible families 
may reduce targeting efficiency as well. 
Given these trade-offs, understanding 
the behavioral response to the lack of 
eligibility monitoring has important 
policy implications. The recertification 
period may be too long if we find 
evidence of families strategically and 
temporarily lowering their incomes in 
order to gain program eligibility. If no 
strategic behavior is found, however, it 
may be beneficial to lengthen the period 
of eligibility. 
Income and Labor Supply Responses
I carry out an empirical investigation 
of the labor supply effect of the 
continuous eligibility provisions in the 
context of Medicaid/CHIP and provide 
a framework to compute the optimal 
eligibility recertification frequency. 
Along with creating the SCHIP program, 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 gives 
states the option to continuously insure 
children for up to 12 months in their 
public insurance programs regardless of 
changes in family income during that 
period. A third of the states implemented 
the continuous eligibility option in their 
public insurance program for children. 
These states present an opportunity 
to gauge the significance of the 
aforementioned strategic behavior, which 
then sheds light on the choice of the 
optimal continuous eligibility period. 
Using the 2001 and 2004 panels 
of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, I follow an event-study 
framework and trace out families’ 
incomes as their children enrolled in 
Medicaid/CHIP. Figure 1 plots the 
movement of average family incomes 
over the 48 months around the beginning 
of a public insurance spell. 
Neither of the panels shows a 
pronounced dip-and-rebound in income 
in the six months before and after the 
spell start. For the 2001 panel, the income 
trend leading up to the beginning of the 
public insurance spell is practically flat; 
the average income increases gradually 
during the spell especially after 12 
months, but the period immediately 
Continuous eligibility 
provisions allow families to 
be less constrained in their 
labor supply decisions.
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following the spell start shows no 
rebound. In the 2004 panel, the income 
process shows a persistent downward 
trend throughout the four-year window 
without a visible rebound. 
Even though the strategic behavior 
predicted by the labor supply model is 
not salient in Figure 1, certain subgroups 
may be expected to exhibit stronger 
responses than others. Examining these 
subgroups separately may help to isolate 
the effects that are otherwise masked in 
the full sample. Among others, I select 
several subsamples in which families 
may adjust their labor supply more easily 
(two-parent families), be more likely to 
understand program rules (at least one 
parent is college educated), or face a 
stronger incentive to behave strategically 
(families with more children). The 
subsample analyses reveal income trends 
similar to those in the full sample and are 
not indicative of strategic behavior. 
Testing Model Predictions
Because of the relatively small 
sample size, I cannot strictly rule out 
a small income rebound in several of 
my samples. Therefore, I calibrate the 
expected income rebound magnitude 
based on a standard economic model 
and compare it to the actual rebound 
magnitude. In all subsamples, the actual 
rebound magnitude is smaller than 
the model-predicted magnitude, and 
the model prediction is rejected with 
confidence. 
Comparisons of income processes 
between counterfactual groups are 
also carried out to address the issues 
of unaccounted income trends over a 
Medicaid/CHIP spell, concentration of 
strategic behavior in only a subset of 
the families, as well as possible model 
misspecification in the calibration 
exercise. I compare the income processes 
between high- and low-income families 
and families in states that did and did 
not provide 12 months of continuous 
eligibility to simultaneously address 
all three of those issues. High-income 
families and those living in states 
providing 12-month continuous eligibility 
are expected to exhibit stronger strategic 
behavior than their counterparts, but the 
counterfactual analysis does not reveal 
the rebound magnitude to be statistically 
significant between the different groups. 
Again, the result provides no evidence 
indicative of the strategic behavior as 
predicted by a standard economic model. 
Optimal Length of the Continuous 
Eligibility Period
With strategic behavior practically 
ruled out, I explore the following policy 
question: What is the right recertification 
frequency for families participating in 
Medicaid/CHIP? The two key factors 
in answering the question are 1) the 
volatility of the income process, and  
2) the costs associated with recertification. 
Intuitively, if income does not change 
at all over time, then the government 
only needs to check income once to 
identify the needy population. But if 
there is a lot of movement across the 
public insurance eligibility cutoff, more 
frequent recertifications may be called 
for, which will remove families from the 
program when they no longer need the 
benefits. The need to monitor income 
must then be weighed against the cost of 
eligibility recertification, which should 
be conducted less frequently if the 
cost of the verification process is high 
for the government or for the program 
participants. 
Using a simple economic 
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monitoring frequency under various 
assumptions regarding social welfare 
and recertification costs. The calculation 
suggests that 12 months may serve as a 
lower bound on the length of the optimal 
continuous eligibility period. That 
said, with technological advancement 
and improved data sharing among 
government agencies, recertification costs 
may decrease significantly in the future, 
in which case the continuous eligibility 
period can be shortened to improve 
targeting efficiency. 
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with the programs and policy recommendations that address those issues. The most 
recent book in the series is From Preschool to Prosperity: The Economic Payoff to 
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